The SOFA is dead. Long live the SOFA!
According to U.S. and Iraqi officials, no agreement on a long-term bilateral security framework will be possible before Bush leaves office. In the absence of a long-term SOFA/SFA, the administration has no intention of re-upping the UNSCR. Instead, they hope to sign a "bridge" document--called a "temporary operating protocol" in Washington and a "memorandum of understanding" in Baghdad--that will allow U.S. operations through the end of 2009. The interim document will also likely include a "time horizon" with specific goals for U.S. troops to withdraw from Iraqi cities, as well as some installations and Saddam-era palaces. It will not be a fixed timetable or even a time horizon for a complete withdrawal.
So the long-term SOFA/SFA will be kicked down the road to the next administration.
Why did the SOFA/SFA talks fail? The standard explanation will be that U.S. negotiators overreached and the combination of Iraqi sovereignty concerns, upcoming provincial elections, and growing (over)confidence among Maliki's crowd in the capabilities of the ISF meant the Iraqis were not willing to meet the Americans even half-way. The is partially right. The bigger problem, however, was how the entire negotiations were framed on the American side.
Because talks were not occurring against the backdrop of negotiating a U.S. withdrawal and a clear signal that we did not want to have the rights and prerogatives to stay in Iraq indefinitely, two things happened:
1. Iraqi sovereignty and nationalist anxieties were exacerbated by the perception that we were negotiating a permanent occupation (regardless of how many times the administration asserted it wasn't seeking permanent bases). This made it difficult for Iraqi officials--including those that wanted a long-term agreement negotiated under Bush--to sign on to anything.
2. U.S. negotiators framed the whole thing to the Iraqis as us wanting to negotiate a way to stay in Iraq. This reversed the leverage in negotiations, making us appear increasingly desperate to give the Iraqis concessions so we could stick around indefinitely. This made it look like we needed them more than they needed us, which is completely back-ass-ward.
If, instead, U.S. negotiators had framed the talks around setting a timeline for a U.S. withdrawal and then sought to establish the conditions for the Iraqi government to receive the residual U.S. support it desperately needs (especially support to the ISF which, despite Maliki's rhetoric, the Iraqis will need for years), then the sovereignty/nationalism issues would have been at least partially addressed and the leverage would have worked in our favor. But because this administration doesn't believe in negotiating a withdrawal and because they have never been willing to impose strategic conditionality on our support to Maliki, they didn't adopt this approach. And they failed.
Let's hope the next administration figures this out and doesn't give the Iraqi government or the Iraqi public the impression that we are hoping to negotiate a deal that lets us stick around for 100 years. Let's also hope that the next administration decides to use our diminishing leverage over the Iraqi government at the strategic level, instead of frittering it away as this administration has.
